The Impact of Connecticut\u27s Clean Election Law: An Empirical Quick Look by Rodriguez, A. E. & DeNardis, Lesley A.
Sacred Heart University 
DigitalCommons@SHU 
Government Faculty Publications Government 
11-2011 
The Impact of Connecticut's Clean Election Law: An Empirical 
Quick Look 
A. E. Rodriguez 
University of New Haven 
Lesley A. DeNardis 
Sacred Heart University, denardisl@sacredheart.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.sacredheart.edu/gov_fac 
 Part of the Election Law Commons, and the State and Local Government Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Rodriguez, A. E., DeNardis, L. (2012). The impact of Connecticut's clean election law: An empirical quick 
look. MPRA Paper (Munich Personal RePEc Archive), 37938, 13,16. 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Government at DigitalCommons@SHU. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Government Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of 
DigitalCommons@SHU. For more information, please contact ferribyp@sacredheart.edu, 
lysobeyb@sacredheart.edu. 
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
The impact of Connecticut’s clean
election law: an empirical quick look
A.E. Rodriguez and Lesley A. DeNardis
University of New Haven
November 2011
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/37938/
MPRA Paper No. 37938, posted 9. April 2012 13:16 UTC
The Impact of Connecticut’s Clean 
Election Law:  




The State of Connecticut’s General Assembly passed a Clean Elections Law 
in 2005.  In this paper we conduct a preliminary appraisal of the law’s 
performance based on recently published data on the voting results of the 
2010 and 2008 state-wide office elections.  The Clean Elections Law was 
considered among the most stringent in the nation at the time of its 
passage.  It established full public financing for all elections to state 
offices, including the state legislature.  The law applied to primaries as 
well as general elections.  It allowed for supplemental monies in 
unbalanced contests pitting a privately-financed candidate against a 
publicly-financed one. The law also contained provisions banning 
campaign donations from lobbyists and state contractors. 
 
Our study is similar to the 2009 one prepared by the Office of Legislative 
Research but with the benefit of additional data drawn from the 2010 
election cycle.  Importantly, we conduct our examination using statistical 
tests with significance thresholds at conventional 95 percent levels.  We 
also add additional performance metrics to provide a wider lens to the 
appraisal.  We use resampling methods to draw multiple simulated 
samples to calculate statistical significance.  Resampling techniques 
provide a non-parametric determination of a statistic’s distribution and a 
measure of effectiveness that is not sensitive to deviations from the 
assumptions underlying most parametric procedures.   
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Based on the results derived from statistical tests of the assembled 
metrics it is difficult to conclude that the public funding of elections in the 
State of Connecticut is an unqualified success, or for that matter, a 
qualified success.  It appear that the one conclusion that we can 
unambiguously draw is that the effusiveness and optimism of the various 
commentators supporting clean election laws has not yet come to be 
realized in the State of Connecticut.   
 
A.E. Rodriguez1 
University of New Haven 
& 
Lesley DeNardis 





                                                     
1
 Rodriguez is corresponding author; Email: arodriguez@newhaven.edu. 
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Introduction 
 
It is morally as bad not to care whether a thing is true or not, so 
long as it makes you feel good, as it is not to care how you got 
your money, as long as you have got it. 
 
Edwin Way Teal (Circle of the Seasons, 1953) 
 
Clean election laws aim to fund races for state assemblies with 
public monies, simultaneously proscribing any number of practices 
including limiting or altogether eliminating private funds expended 
in support of any candidate (General Accounting Office 2003, 
Zagaja 2009).  Clean elections laws, in the view of advocates, 
constitute a remedy for a variety of social ills including government 
corruption, excessive interest-group influence, wasteful and 
excessive campaign spending, minimal electoral competition and 
lethargic individual voter participation (Mayer, Werner and 
Williams 2005). 
In 2005, the State of Connecticut’s General Assembly passed a 
Clean Elections’ Law, possibly the most stringent in the nation at 
the time (Nyhart 2006).  The Citizens Election Program established 
full public financing for all elections to state offices, including the 
state legislature (Mayer and Werner 2007, Zagaja 2009).  The law 
applied to primaries as well as general elections.  It allowed for 
supplemental monies in unbalanced contests pitting a privately-
financed candidate against a publicly-financed one. The law also 
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contains provisions banning campaign donations from lobbyists and 
state contractors. 
There are only three formal appraisal of Connecticut Citizens’ 
Elections Program (to our knowledge): an analysis by Sullivan, of 
the Office of Legislative Research (Sullivan 2009) and a study by 
Zagaja (Zagaja 2009).  In addition, Parnell conducts an interesting 
albeit limited study examining whether the election law has altered 
voting patterns of legislators (Parnell 2010). 
Sullivan examined the effect of the legislation on (i) voter choice, 
(ii) electoral competition, (iii) voter participation and (iii) program 
participation data by examining changes between the 2006 and the 
2008 election cycle.  Although not testing for statistical significance 
the findings of the Sullivan’s Office of Legislative Research study 
were charitably inconclusive at best, noting that: “it is too early to 
draw any causal linkages to changes, if any, that resulted from the 
public financing programs (Sullivan 2009)”. 
Zagaja examines quantitative and qualitative changes in several 
metrics between 2004 and 2008: (i) electoral landscape, (ii) 
participations, (iii) electoral competition, (iv) diversity, (v) 
decreasing the actual or appearance of influence by interest groups 
and candidates, limited excessive campaign spending, allowing 
candidates to spend less time fundraising, and, (vi) increasing voter 
confidence and participation.  Zagaja’s results are decidedly mixed.  
Although Zagaja does not rely on statistical testing in arriving at 
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conclusions his results are instructive nevertheless perhaps because 
of the added perspective provided by the various qualitative 
measures attempted.  Zagaja’s findings suggest that the electoral 
law’s goals were met in only two of the seven metrics he examines: 
(i) participation, and, (vi) allowing candidates to spend less time 
fundraising.  As for the remaining six measures, they were either 
inconclusive or conferred no support for the electoral law claim.  
Specifically: scrutiny of (ii) electoral competition, (iii) diversity, (iv) 
decreasing the actual or appearance of influence by interest groups 
on candidates, and, (v) limiting excessive campaign spending, 
proffered no support for the electoral law thesis.  
Parnell takes aim at the special interest rationale of the Connecticut 
election law (Parnell 2010).  He measures changes in the voting 
patterns of legislators who served in the Connecticut General 
Assembly during the 2007-08 session and accepted taxpayer dollars 
for their 2008 reelection campaign.  Specifically, he argues that by 
identifying significant interest groups and comparing their legislative 
priorities to voting patterns, a finding of a noticeable change in voting 
since the beginning of election law constitutes support for the 
argument that freeing legislators from private, voluntary contributions 
has indeed made legislators more responsive to citizens and less 
responsive to so-called special interests (Parnell 2010). Parnell’s more 
limited and more focused study finds “no evidence to support the 
contention that providing taxpayer dollars to legislative candidates 
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reduces the likelihood that a legislator will vote with an interest 
group” 
In this paper we conduct an appraisal similar to the Office of 
Legislative Research (Sullivan) study but with the benefit of 
additional data drawn from the 2010 election cycle.  Importantly, 
we conduct our examination using statistical tests with significance 
thresholds at conventional 95 percent levels.  We also add other 
performance metrics to provide a wider lens to the appraisal.   
There as two important qualifications regarding our results.  First, 
there are neither theoretical nor standard metrics that can be 
invoked ex ante in the examination of legislation such as the 
election law of Connecticut.  Although one can conceivably 
assemble a significantly large number of informative metrics 
appraising the impact of election laws generally, several authors 
consistently examine the same few variables. We examine the 
Sullivan metrics and a few others popular with researchers.  
However, and for purposes of establishing criteria for success - few 
of these metrics are outcome metrics; all are instrumental ones. 
Thus, success is in terms of the particular realization of the 
instrumental metric and not necessarily in terms of ultimate 
outcomes – however defined.   
For instance, consider the metric ‘voter participation.’  If the 
number of voters increases after the adoption of the election law, 
all else equal, one could attribute the increase to the law and 
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thereby argue that the law has been shown to be a success. 
However, no such conclusion can be established if the ultimate 
outcome of interest is the economic fortunes of the state – gauged 
in terms of ‘state product per capita,’ ‘the unemployment rate,’ or, 
‘construction permits’ or any other representative result.   
The second concern is that no one metric is privileged and 
therefore several instrumental metrics are examined.  Similarly, 
there is no conceptually distinct and a priori aggregation weighting 
scheme.  Thus, to the extent that the examined metrics convey 
different and possible contradictory inferences there can be no 
definitive way to conclude as to whether the election law was 
successful – even if we examine only instrumental metrics. 
Our results reflect those of Sullivan, Zagaja and those of Parnell.  
Our efforts at determining the significance of the law are mixed: 
some metrics do suggest statistically meaningful differences 
whereas many others don’t.  No results are evident in the 2008 
cycle.  With token exceptions, all of the minute differences 
observed, when they are in fact observed, occur by the 2010 
election cycle.  
Ironically, a law aiming to enhance electoral competition in the 
state of Connecticut strengthened the position of the Democrats in 
a robustly blue state: the results of several metrics appear to have 
bestowed a slight edge to Democrats, at the expense of 
Republicans.  That the legislation may have benefited Democrats 
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may be ironical but it is also unsurprising.  Notwithstanding house 
republican leader Larry Cafero’s observation that “the CEP made it 
easier for his party to recruit candidates to run for office in 
uncontested districts,”2 one would think that election law 
proscriptions handicapping the ability of potential candidates to 
raise money would most likely affect the generally more affluent 
republicans.   
Some caveats: despite the poor statistical showing of the election 
law performance metrics in Connecticut it is distinctly possible that 
the election law succeeds in “cleaning-up” the observed qualitative 
electoral-related ills, as has been argued. On the other hand, 
because of remaining porosity in the financing system the current 
version of the law may not sufficiently curtail the continuing 
practice of indirect flow of private funds to benefit favored 
candidates.  And given the curtailing presence of Citizens United it is 
not clear whether there can be any further tightening (Citizens 
United v. Federal Election Commission 2010). Thus, we cannot 
conclusively claim that the law does not work or that it works badly; 
and we do not claim as much.  Nevertheless, it does appear that 
any benefits of clean election laws are more evident in the telling 
than in reality. 
 
                                                     
2
 Cited in (Zagaja 2009). 
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The Backdrop  
Corruption scandals culminating with the one surrounding then 
Governor John Rowland left an unsightly blemish on Connecticut 
state politics at the beginning of the new century.  John Rowland 
announced his resignation in June 2004.  He was sentenced to 
federal prison in 2005, charged with receiving improper gifts and 
campaign contributions.  Convicted around this time were two 
sitting-majors, Joseph Ganim of Bridgeport and Phil Giordano of 
Waterbury as well as the State Treasurer Paul Sylvester.  And with 
the turmoil came calls for action, for reform, despite the fact that 
reformers such the Connecticut Citizen Action Group and the 
Connecticut chapter of Common Cause had spent a decade 
attempting to move the issue onto the legislative agenda.  
Rowland’s subsequent resignation from office finally hastened the 
passage of legislation, resulting in the Act Concerning 
Comprehensive Reform for Statewide Constitutional and General 
Assembly Offices (Nyhart 2006).  
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Public Financing of Elections 
A primary objective behind the boxing-in or outright removal of 
private money in campaigns is to lessen influence peddling in 
government outcomes: the ubiquitous “pay-to-play” influence of 
interest groups in public policy.  Ostensibly, in substituting state 
monies in lieu of private monies elected officials will no longer be 
beholden to the special interests represented by their contributors.  
In turn, the implicit outcome of this cleansing would lead to 
legislative outcomes that clearly reflect, or better reflect, the 
interests of the majority.   
Relatedly, the laws also attempt to reach the persistence of 
incumbency.  Before there existed any public monies made 
available by clean election laws, aspiring officeholders were 
compelled to either raise money from citizens or interest groups or 
self-finance their campaigns. In the face of a seemingly monolithic 
incumbent few potential donors were willing to support a 
challenger. Few candidates had the wherewithal to pay their own 
way.  The perception of invincibility associated with incumbency in 
effect translated into a full-employment act for sitting legislators 
(Mayer and Werner 2007).  
Election law reformers felt that the seeming sense of entitlement 
brandished by sitting legislators created by the lack of a credible 
threat of removal rendered them ineffective and inattentive to the 
concerns of their constituents.  Public monies and limits on 
donations were considered an effective way to overcome the 
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“barriers to entry.” Small donations pose a less serious threat 
because the individuals who make them are in no position to 
extract quid-pro-quo type of concessions from legislators.  Yet 
despite the “breath-of-fresh-air” quality and the bona fide 
innovations intended by the clean election laws several 
inconsistencies can be noticed. 
In Connecticut, the clean elections law adopted in 2005 was not a 
voter initiative as they are in the few other states who have 
embraced such reform.  Rather, it was a legislative act.  But if 
individual state legislators knew that influence peddling was 
endemic across their ranks – why not simply refuse to do the 
special interest’s bidding?  Why chose the more elaborate process 
of assembling legislation to address this problem? Opting for 
legislation – an approach which binds all – appears to be a solution 
to a run-of-the-mill social dilemma problem (Elster 2007, Huberman 
and Glance 1994).  Every legislator was aware that collectively they 
would all be better off if they refused special interest monies.  And 
getting elected – even in state legislature races – requires money.  
Yet, to individually refuse to accept money from lobbyists was 
impractical because the money would simply be funneled to a more 
willing state assemblyman; after all, at some level assemblymen are 
a fungible lot.  By collectively agreeing to a common course of 
action via legislation to avoid accepting special interest monies the 
legislature found a solution to their “commons” problem.  
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A second puzzling observation logically suggests itself.  It’s not 
clear that refusing private monies will lead to better social 
outcomes.  To our knowledge no meaningful evidence linking the 
provision of the state funding of candidates to improved legislative 
performance was provided. In fact, some would argue that the 
impact on legislation has been nil.  Voting by legislatures in the 
2010 assembly was virtually indistinguishable from the previous 
legislative voting patterns (Parnell 2010).  Nor was there any 
evidence linking the proposed measure or to any other 
performance metric, for that matter.  In fact and to the contrary, 
one can envision any number of scenarios in which the resulting 
will of the majority, unencumbered by private monies, could have 
serious negative economic repercussions.  Thus, one has to wonder 
why the focus of the clean elections legislation on what are merely 
instrumental measures-rather than on measures that would 
guarantee desired social outcomes – to the extent that it was 
possible?   
We conjecture that with implicit instrumental measures the 
central concern of the public funding of elections law adopted by 
Connecticut is its own reward.  Indeed, the literature around the 
“fairness heuristic” finds compelling evidence that most people 
resort to perceived procedural fairness when information on the 
trustworthiness of an authority is unavailable or corrupted (van den 
Boos, Wilke and Lind 1998). Like Pompeia, the legislature must 
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appear to be beyond reproach.  The seeming impropriety of being 
seen as beholden to private interests, especially after the uproar 
resulting in the Governor Rowland’s impeachment, was diminishing 
their moral stature in the community – and their re-election 
chances.  
We cannot answer; we can only surmise.  But we can examine 
the performance of several instrumental measures and thereby 
provide a basis for tentative answers. This is our task in this paper.  
To some extent, the ultimate impact of Connecticut’s efforts will 
depend on of the evolving resolution of the recent controversial 
U.S. Supreme Court ruling in Citizens United v. Federal Election 
Commission.  In Citizens United the courts signaled its intention to 
roll-back even long-standing limits on corporate campaign 
contributions (The Hartford Courant 2011).  
 
Empirical Methodology, Data Sources, Performance Metrics, 
Limitations & Scope 
We examine whether there is any statistically significant change 
in the levels of various metrics between the periods before and 
after the implementation of the legislation.  Specifically, we 
scrutinize those variables originally examined by Sullivan:  
(i) voter registration data  
(ii) party registration data 
(iii) election results 
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We do so for the 2006 state assembly elections and compare 
them to voter and party registration data and state assembly 
election results in 2008 and in 2010, respectively (Sullivan 2009).  In 
principle, any observed statistically significant change in a given 
metric is consistent with a hypothesis attributing causality to the 
public elections law (Imbens and Wooldridge 2008).  Put simply: 
any effects thereby attributable to the election laws could be 
observable in the 2008 and 2010 election results.  
We use resampling methods and draw multiple simulated 
samples to calculate statistical significance (Good 2001).  Since the 
distribution of any statistic is attainable using resampling methods 
it is possible to test any number of performance metrics.   
In this instance resampling conveys three advantages over 
parametric and non-parametric approaches.  Resampling 
techniques provide a non-parametric determination of a 
performance metric’s distribution and a measure of effectiveness 
that is not sensitive to deviations from the assumptions underlying 
most parametric procedures.  The simulated samples are drawn 
from extant elections outcomes data instead of draws from a 
theoretical data-generation process.  The heteroskedasticity and 
the small-numbers characteristics of the elections outcome data 
are not consistent the desired error distributions and thereby 
greatly limit the applicability of stochastic data models such as the 
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traditional logistic or multiple linear regression models (Breiman 
2001).   
Potentially useful non-parametric tests such as the Wilcoxon 
signed rank test and the sign-test are not constrained by the a-
priori data assumptions required by stochastic data models.  
However, their flexibility comes at a loss of statistical power.  It is 
usually more difficult to reject the null hypothesis when non-
parametrics are used, which in turn increases our chances of 
incurring a type-II error (a failure to reject a null hypothesis that is 
false). Thus, avoiding non-parametric methods would tend to 
enhance the chances of a finding in favor of observable effects of 
the elections law. 
Last, we analyze statistical constructs in our analysis – e.g. 
measures of diversity such as the gini coefficient, the herfindahl 
index, and vote sums or totals, inter alia – for which the theoretical 
statistical behavior is not known. In these instances the observed 
sample statistic is compared with the null resampling distribution 
derived from our resampling protocol discussed below. 
We set forth our null hypothesis of no difference in the levels of 
the examined statistics.  Generally: 
Ho: Φ2 - Φ1 = 0 
Ha: Φ2 – Φ1 ≠ 0 
Where: Φi represents the realization of a particular statistic in 
the given election-cycle year `i’ and where year `1’ is always 2006. 
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We generate via monte carlo simulation the permutation 
distribution of the test statistics.  We run 10,000 iterations using 
Stata.  We calculate the observed difference between the simulated 
2008 and 2010 election (or 2006 and 2010, as the case might be) 
assuming a null hypothesis of no difference in election results.  We 
compare the frequency of occurrence of this simulated statistic 
with the observed difference between the levels of the statistic.  
We reject the hypothesis and accept the alternative if the value of 
the test statistic for the observations is an extreme value in the 
permutation distribution of the statistic.  We use 95 percent 
significance.  
 
Data Sources and Data Treatment 
 
The data used in examining the election law performance were 
obtained from publicly available data for the years 2006, 2007, and 
2008. Specifically, we culled data on the ‘vote for state 
representatives’ for all ‘assembly districts’ reporting.  The data is 
published online by the Connecticut Secretary of State. (Secretary 
of the State 2006) (Secretary of the State 2008, Secretary of the 
State 2010). 
The table below offers a comparative look at the metrics across 
the three extant election cycles.  
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Table 1 
State Assembly Election Results 
Sullivan Metrics 
        
Metric 2006 2008 2010 
Average Number of 
Candidates per District 
Race 1.66 1.64 1.79 
Challengers 99 98 119 
Incumbents 151 151 151 
total number of 
candidates 250 249 270 
total number of races 151 151 151 
    Percentage of 
Uncontested Races 27.8% 29.1% 20.5% 
    Voter Participation 943,710  1,378,631  1,074,318  
    Minor Party Affiliation 36.0% 37.3% 23.2% 
     
For expositional purposes, we construct a second table.  Table 2 
contains the realized difference in the levels of each of the metrics 
listed in Table 1.  The figure in italics under each measure of 
realized change is the p-value obtained from our statistical test.  
The asterisks over each particular p-value indicate whether the 
difference is statistically meaningful at a 95 percent level of 
significance.   
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Table 2 
Realized Changes in the Sullivan Metrics: 
Base Year 2006 
Metric 2006-08 2006-10 
Change in the Number of 
Participating Voters 
         
434,921  
         
30,608  
p-value (0.0001)* (0.0017)* 
Change in the Number of 
Challengers per District 
Race 
                   
(2) 20 
p-value (0.8059) (0.0146)* 
Change in the 
Percentage of 
Uncontested Races 1.3% -8.6% 
p-value (0.5649) (0.0146)* 
Minor Party Affiliation 1.3% -12.8% 
p-value (0.6158) (0.0135)* 
 
We observe the following.  The direction of change in the levels 
between the 2006 and 20008 election cycles were to the contrary 
of what one would expect. However, but for the number of 
participating voters, no change in the levels of the Sullivan metrics 
was statistically significant.  And given the impressive ability to 
energize voters by the 2008 Obama campaign it is not clear 
whether the observed statistically significant increase in the 
number of participating voters can be attributed in part – or at all – 
to the election law.  
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Additional Metrics 
 
We examine several additional metrics to capture the relevance of 
other dimensions of the reach of the elections law.  Specifically, we 
examine the following:  
 
(i) Change in the margin of victory for each particular 
state house race, both in absolute terms and as a 
percent of the total vote.  We hypothesize that the 
increased competitive vigor brought about by the 
increased funding would reduce the margin of 
victory as measured by both metrics. 
(ii) Electoral races are considered competitive if the 
average outcome of races is less than or equal to 
60%.  We hypothesize that the electoral law should 
increase competitiveness.   
(iii) Another measure of competitiveness of vigor is the 
total number of votes cast by the opposition.  We 
hypothesize that the electoral law should 
unequivocally result in an increase in the number of 
votes cast by the opposition. 
(iv) Diversity is considered a desirable outcome. We 
examine whether there has been an increase in 
diversity with the Hirschman-Herfindahl Index of 
Concentration (HHI).  We look at the share of party 
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presence in the various races and also at the share of 
total votes garnered by each party.  The HHI is a 
sample statistics and therefore its sampling variance 
can be calculated.  Formally, the index is calculated 
as follows: 
 
HHI = 10,000*  
Where: Si is the relevant share of the either party presence or share 
of votes.  The higher the index the less diversity is present.  The 
maximum is HHI = 10,000, representing a one party outcome. 
  The data on the realized value of these other metrics are 
presented in Table 3. 
 Page 21 of 28 
 
Table 3 
Metric 2006 2008 2010 
Average Winning Margin of 
Races (Levels) 3142 4352 2297 
    Winning Margin of Votes Cast (% 
of total votes cast) 57.5% 54.8% 41.0% 
    Competitive Vote Margin (is the 
average outcome less than or 
equal to 60%?) 60.0% 55.0% 71.5% 
    Total Number of Votes Cast by 
Opposition 
   
233,864  
   
361,352  
   
367,999  
    Diversity Index of Opposition 
(Herfindahl on Share of Party 
Presence in the Various Races) 3588 3562 3995 
    Diversity Index of Opposition 
(Herfindahl on Share of Votes 
Garnered by Party) 5844 5402 5849 
 
Results: Additional Metrics 
 
Procedurally we use the same methodology described above.  
Formally we test for any change at the 95 percent significance level 
assuming a null hypothesis of no change.  We again use 
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permutation methods to test our hypothesis and to generate our p-
values.  The results are presented in Table 4. 
Table 4 
Metric 2006-08 2006-10 
Change in the Average Winning 
Margin of Voters 
       
1,209  
         
(845) 
p-value (0.561) (0.487) 
Difference in the Winning 
Margin of Votes Cast (% of total 
votes cast) 
       
(0.03) 
       
(0.17) 
p-value (0.657) (0.0417)* 
Difference in the Competitive 
Vote Margin (is the average 
outcome less than or equal to 
60%) 
       
(0.05) 
          
0.12  
p-value (0.053) (0.0017)* 
Change in the Total Number of 
Votes Cast by Opposition 
   
127,488  
   
134,135  
p-value (0.031)* (0.0432)* 
Change in the Diversity Index of 
Opposition (Herfindahl on Share 
of Party Presence in the Various 
Races) 
           
(27) 
           
407  
p-value (0.671) (0.450) 
Change in the Diversity Index of 
Opposition (Herfindahl on Share 
of Votes Garnered by Party) 
         
(442) 
                
5  
p-value (0.759) (0.562) 
      
 
The overall results remain consistent with the overall results 
obtained from testing the Sullivan metrics.  First, few of the metrics 
exhibit statistically significant change between the 2006 and 2008 
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election cycle.  Thus, the observed improvement in the winning 
margin of votes cast as a percent of total votes cast is not 
statistically significant.  The same findings emerge for the two 
diversity indexes estimated.  Second, there is discernible change in 
the metrics between 2006 and 2008 that is contrary to what one 
would expect – but the change is not statistically significant.  For 
example, there is an increase in the average winning margin (levels) 
of votes between 2006 an 2008 (from 3142 votes to 4352) rather 
than the anticipated decrease.   
There are more significant changes in the comparison with the 
2010 election cycle.  But the results are contradictory.  We find 
positive improvements in the winning margin of votes cast but a 
deterioration of competitive vote margin.  Both are statistically 
significant.  Importantly, the diversity indexes show no statistically 
discernible improvement at all, whether from the comparison to 
the 2008 or the 2010 cycle.  A somewhat troubling indicator is the 
fact that party and opposition diversity appears to have 
deteriorated by 2010 when compared to the party and opposition 
layout present in the 2006 election, although the difference is not 
statistically meaningful.  
 
Interpretation of Results and Concluding Comments 
Our results examining the impact on metrics aimed at appraising 
the impact of the law are inconclusive: some metrics do suggest 
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statistically meaningful differences whereas many others do not.  
Hardly any statistically significant results are evident in the 2008 
cycle.  With token exceptions, all of the minute differences 
observed, when they are in fact observed, occur by the 2010 
election cycle.  
Ironically, a law aiming to enhance electoral competition 
strengthened the position of the Democrats in a robustly blue state: 
the results of several metrics appear to have bestowed a slight 
edge to Democrats, at the expense of Republicans.  That the 
legislation may have benefited Democrats may be ironical but it is 
also unsurprising.  To the extent that proscriptions handicap the 
ability of potential candidates to raise money it is most likely to 
affect the generally more affluent republicans.   
Given the inconclusiveness in the information elicited by our 
examination of the various metrics assembled it is difficult to 
conclude that the public funding of elections in the State of 
Connecticut is an unqualified success, or for that matter, a qualified 
success.  First, no one metric takes precedence over another.  
Second, any weighted combination of metrics must necessarily rely 
on subjective weights.  Third, performance is essentially 
multidimensional: superior performance against one objective 
cannot easily be traded off against modest or inadequate 
performance on another.  Fourth, several of the proposed ‘success’ 
criteria may be specified inadequately. Fifth, and at any rate, 
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`success’ in this instance refers to the performance of the chosen 
metrics.  Put differently, our examination scrutinized instruments, 
not final outcomes. 
It should be clear that the lack of conclusive discernible effects is 
not evidence against the proffered benefits of the Connecticut 
clean election law.  Our inconclusive results may be an artifact of 
the data, in other words, we could have an instance in which the 
hypothesis is true but our metrics are poor representations of the 
hypothesis, resulting in false negatives. The result may also be a 
consequence of low statistical power, or the fact that the 
“administration” of the law was faulty, or even that the existing law 
left several gaping loopholes. In fact, one could realistically argue 
that because of remaining porosity in the system the current law 
may not sufficiently curtail the privately-directed flow of funds to 
favored candidates. And given the presence of Citizens United it is 
not clear whether there can be any further tightening.  A critical 
limitation of our study is the lack of covariates designed to hold 
exogenous influences constant.  It may very well be that there is a 
vigorous effect ascribable to the election law but that is not 
noticeable because it is eroded by broader confounding influences 
– for which we don’t control.  Last, given the historical importance 
of local town and municipal elections in Connecticut a law aimed at 
alleviating the ills of the state electoral system may miss the well 
known point that all elections are really local, leading one to think 
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that we are looking for lost keys where the light is and not where 
we dropped them.   
It is distinctly possible that election law has succeeded in 
“cleaning-up” the observed intangible ills – the lingering sense of 
corruption, the bothersome belief that only the more affluent are 
listened to - as was argued. There is some support for that 
perception.  But more accurate or more specific tests will have to 
wait a different occasion.   
Thus, we cannot conclusively claim that the law does not work or 
that it works badly. It appear that the one conclusion that we can 
unambiguously draw is that the effusiveness and optimism of the 
various commentators supporting clean election laws has not come 
to be realized in the State of Connecticut.   
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